Abstractions of programs are traditionally over-approximations and have proved to be useful for the verification of safety properties. They are presently perceived as being useless for the falsification of safety properties, i.e. showing that program execution definitely reaches a "bad" state. Alternative techniques, such as the computation of under-approximating must transitions, have addressed this shortcoming in the past. We show that over-approximating models can indeed falsify safety properties by relying on and exploiting the seriality and partial determinism of programs: programs don't just stop for no reason, and most program statements have deterministic semantics. Our method is based on solving a two-person attractor game derived from over-approximating models and makes no assumptions about the abstraction domain used. An example demonstrates the successful use of our approach, and highlights the role played by seriality and our handling of nondeterminism. Finally, we show that our method can encode must transitions, if supplied, by a simple modification of the ownership of nodes in the attractor game derived from the over-approximating model.
Introduction
For over thirty years, over-approximating models have been used for verifying safety properties of programs. Intuitively an over-approximating model has all the behaviours of the original program, and possibly many more; this is expressed by conditions such as trace-inclusion and simulation. Verification of safety properties is based on the following observation: because an over-approximating model has at least all the behaviours of the original program, any "bad" behaviours (i.e. those that violate the desired safety property) present in the program are also present in the model. Therefore, if the model contains no bad behaviours, the program does not either. Systems such as SLAM [1] , BLAST [10] and our own system HECTOR [5] have been developed which automatically extract over-approximating models from programs using abstraction. However, the above scheme does not allow the falsification of safety properties, because bad behaviours found in the model need not be present in the original program -they may be "artifacts" introduced by the over-approximation process, and therefore "not feasible" in the original program. Approaches to the falsification of safety properties have focused on showing that abstract counterexamples are indeed feasible, for example by:
(i) searching for a corresponding concrete counterexample (e.g. [14] ),
(ii) proving the feasibility of the abstract counterexample path by satisfiability checking (e.g. [1] ), or (iii) adding under-approximation or calculation of "must-transitions" to the model (e.g. [8, 9] ).
Here we present a method of falsifying safety properties which uses only overapproximating models. In particular, our method doesn't perform any of the tasks i, ii, iii above. Instead, our method is based on playing a two-player game over the transition graph of the over-approximating model, and exploits two properties of programs: seriality (execution of a program does not just "stop" for no reason) and what we call partial determinism. By this we mean that most program statements are deterministic, so any nondeterminism in the program or its instrumentation is confined to a small number of identifiable locations. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the notions of programs, models and safety properties we use. Section 3 shows how to use twoplayer games to falsify safety properties without performing any of the usual tasks listed above. Section 4 presents an illuminating example of falsification. Section 5 shows how our approach supports the easy incorporation of must information when it is available. Section 6 concludes and discusses related work. An appendix contains all omitted proofs, to be read at the discretion of referees.
Background
Programs and their semantics.
We begin by setting out the kinds of programs, models and safety properties we deal with in this paper. It will be seen that our setup is very general.
In this paper, we work with programs expressed as control flow graphs (CFGs). Figure 1 shows two simple such programs, drawn with unfilled nodes. Formally, each control flow graph is encoded by giving a set of locations Locs, which includes an element start, and a function E : Locs → Edges mapping each location l to the single (hyper)edge leaving it. The allowed forms of edges are:
• Conditional (hyper)edges: if(Φ) : l 1 : l 2 . These transfer control to location l 1 if the condition Φ holds, and to l 2 otherwise.
• Edges for ordinary statements: f : l . These execute the statement f and transfer control to location l.
• Choice (hyper)edges: choice : l 1 : l 2 . These represent nondeterminstic choice, and (in a sense) transfer control to both l 1 and to l 2 .
(Here Φ is a guard condition, and Φ ⊆ State denotes the set of states in which 2 Φ holds. In this paper we assume nothing about guard conditions Φ or − .) To give semantics to our programs, we assume a set State of program states, including an initial state s init in which execution begins. We also assume that for each ordinary statement f, an associated transfer function f : State → State is given.
Note that we work at a high level of abstraction, assuming nothing about the nature of the state space State and the transfer functions f , so that for instance our results apply equally to languages with heaps as to those without.
As is customary, we put a transition system semantics onto programs. A program's transition system has state space Locs × State, whose elements we call configurations. The transition relation − → ⊆ State × State is given by the following (named) rules:
We say that a configuration (l, s) is reachable if there exists a sequence (l 1 ,
We stated in the introduction that our development will depend on seriality and determinism, so we establish a lemma for these, which looks fairly innocuous but will be crucial later.
Lemma 2.1 Seriality and partial determinism of − →. The concrete transition relation − → is (i) serial, i.e. for all configurations (l, s), there exists a configuration (l , s ) such that (l, s) − → (l , s ).
(ii) partially deterministic, i.e. for all configurations (l, s) with E(l) not of form choice :
Abstraction domains.
Our abstract models of programs will be built from abstraction domains. An abstraction domain in this paper will consist of a set A of abstract values, and a concretisation function γ : A → P(State) which gives meaning to the abstract values. This very general formulation is all that is needed in this paper, and so our results apply to arbitrary abstraction domains, though in practise an abstraction domain Fig. 1 . The unfilled nodes, and their associated transitions, show the control flow graphs of two simple programs. The attached filled nodes, and their associated (green) transitions, depict sound default augmented models for the programs, built using sign analysis. Our method establishes that both programs reach their terminated states, unlike a conventional treatment of must transitions e.g. [8] .
comes with more components, such as abstract successor functions (see e.g. [13, 6] ). Our development here also applies to the analysis modules presented in [4, 3] .
Model checking queries.
In this paper, we will consider a particular type of safety property: our queries will be expressed by giving a set B ⊆ Loc × State of "bad" configurations, and asking whether any of the bad configurations are reachable in the program. If no b ∈ B is reachable, then the safety property represented by B is true (which we will abbreviate to "B is true"). On the other hand if some b ∈ B is reachable, then the safety property represented by B is false (which we will abbreviate to "B is false"). We will not go into the issue of how one abstractly represents such a set B. H1 ensures that transitions in the model only occur between locations that are connected by CFG edges, so that the transition structure of the model falls into line with the structure of the CFG. H2 ensures that choice edges are treated simply as junctions, by not allowing the abstract value to change across a choice edge.
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Figures 1 and 2 (page 9) are examples of such abstract models, drawn using the filled nodes (ignoring the P/F annotations for now). These models are built using a sign analysis, an abstraction domain which tracks only the sign of each variable, i.e. whether it is negative, zero or positive, and discards all other information. Definition 2.3 Soundness of abstract models. An abstract model M as above is said to be sound if the following, standard simulation-type, condition holds:
It can be seen that the models in Figure 1 are sound. Verification of safety properties, in the standard way described in the introduction, can be performed on the basis of S1; we will not dwell on this as we concentrate on falsification here. Proof: Let s ∈ γ(a). By Lemma 2.1 (seriality) there exists (l , s ) such that (l, s) − → (l , s ). Applying S1 completes the proof. 2
Our games on over-approximating models
We now show how to use two-player games to falsify safety properties. The intuition of what follows is that, given a safety property B, we are going to play a two-person game, where the positions are the nodes n ∈ N of an over-approximating model. We call the players F and P: player F is trying to Falsify B, and player P is trying to Prevent this from happening. A move at position n means choosing n such that n abs − − → n ; node n becomes the new position. An extra function ρ determines which player is to move at each position. Player F wins by forcing the game into a position n = (l, a) where for all s ∈ γ(a), we have (l, s) ∈ B, i.e. all concrete configurations represented by n are "bad". Of course, we cannot just use any old partition of the nodes among the two players. The following definition sets out what we require from such a partition. (In A1 the quantifier pattern is ∀∃, and in A2 it is ∃∃, which is reminiscent of the relations R ∀∃ and R ∃∃ from [7] .) 
A2 Let ρ((l, a)) = P and s ∈ γ(a). Then there exists (l , a ) such that (l, a) abs − − → (l , a ) and there exists s ∈ γ(a ) such that (l, s) − → (l , s ).
The models in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (page 9) are sound augmented models, with the ρ function depicted with P/F annotations at each abstract node.
To perform falsification, we introduce a judgement Hn which means that the abstract node (or game position) n ∈ N is "Hopeless" with respect to the set B of bad configurations, i.e. that once execution reaches n there is no hope for avoiding forever the set of bad configurations B. The named derivation rules for this judgement are as follows.
and Hn Hn
The following theorem shows that what we are calling "hopeless" nodes really do inevitably lead to a bad configuration. Its subsequent corollary justifies falsification using sound augmented models and the judgement H. Theorem 3.3 Let M + be a sound augmented model, and B a safety property. Let n = (l, a) ∈ N and s ∈ γ(a). If Hn then there exists (l 1 ,
Proof: We proceed by structural induction on the derivation of Hn.
Base case: The base case is when Hn is derived by a single application of a rule. This can only be the h-all-bad rule. (At first glance it appears there is a possibility of using h-P-move if n has no successors, but since s ∈ γ(a), Lemma 2.4 shows this is impossible.) From the premises of h-all-bad and s ∈ γ(a), we have (l, s) ∈ B. Taking the one-element sequence (l, s) we are done.
Inductive case for h-P-move: From the premises of h-P-move we have ρ(n) = P . Applying A2, we see that there exists (l , a ) such that (l, a) abs − − → (l , a ), and there exists s ∈ γ(a ) such that (l, s) − → (l, s ). Now, also from the premises of h-P-move, we see that H(l , a ). Applying the induction hypothesis and renumbering, we obtain (
Set (l 1 , s 1 ) := (l, s) and we are done.
Inductive case for h-F-move: By the premises of h-F-move there exists n = (l , a ) such that n abs − − → n and Hn . Also from the premises of h-F-move we have ρ(n) = F . This means we can apply A1 to obtain an s ∈ γ(a ) such that (l, s) − → (l, s ). Applying the induction hypothesis to n = (l , s ) and renumbering, there exists a sequence (
Corollary 3.4 Falsification with sound augmented models. Let M + be a sound augmented model, and let B be a safety property. Let (start, a) ∈ N such that
The above is all well and good, but how do we obtain a sound augmented model for a program? Below we present a way to turn any sound over-approximating model (supporting verification only) into a sound augmented model (supporting falsification also). The construction is very easy, and simply assigns all abstract nodes corresponding to choice edges to player F, and all other nodes to player P. Augmented models constructed in this way capture precisely the "must information" implicitly present in the original over-approximating model: at choice nodes all choices are taken, and at other nodes some choice must be taken, as execution cannot simply stop. Such models allow, as we shall see, the falsification of some safety properties, by means of solving an attractor game.
The augmented models in Figures 1 and 2 are all default augmented models. , s) ; on the other hand if l 2 = l then the choice-2 rule provides the same conclusion. By H2, we have a = a, whence s ∈ γ(a ). Putting s := s we have found, as required,
Proof of A2: Let ρ((l, a)) = P and s ∈ γ(a). By Lemma 2.1 (seriality), there exists a configuration (l , s ) such that (l, s) − → (l , s ). By S1 (soundness) there exists (l , a ) ∈ N such that (l, a) abs − − → (l , a ) and s ∈ γ(a ).
It is in the A2 part of the preceding proof that seriality played its key part. To decide whether Hx for a particular node x (typically start), we simply apply the three rules for H over and over again, discovering more and more nodes n for which Hn, until either we have shown Hx, or no more applications of the rules are possible. This can be viewed as computing, in the underlying two-person game, as much of the attractor as is needed to determine whether it includes x. Example 3.7 Using the augmented model in Figure 1 (left) we can prove that the program reaches the error state, i.e. we can falsify the safety property given by bad states B := {ERROR} × State. We begin by using the h-all-bad rule to establish H(ERROR, [x : zero]) and H(ERROR, [x : pos]). This reflects the fact that if execution reaches these nodes then clearly the safety property has been broken. Now we consider the node (1, [x : pos]), which is a node of player P. We have shown H for each of its abs − − →-successors, so we can use the h-P-move rule to get H(1, [x : pos]). This reflects the fact that although the abstraction used (here: sign analysis) cannot tell which way execution goes from the H(1, [x : pos]), it must go somewhere, and wherever it goes, the safety property will be broken. One further application of h-P-move gives us H(start, zero), whence, by Corollary 3.4, B is false, that is, execution reaches the error state.
The model in Figure 1 (right) allows a similar proof that ERROR is reached, but shows that uncertainty over which path execution takes through the program can be dealt with, as well as uncertainty over the values of the program's variables.
In-depth example
Example 4.1 The program in Figure 2 generates an arbitrary natural number n and then computes n − 1 in y and the integer square root of n in x, that is, finds x such that x 2 ≤ n < (x + 1) 2 . The program is instrumented with a conditional which checks that the correct square root has been calculated, and transitions to the ERROR state if not. However, we have introduced a "mistake": the guard for the square root computation part is the negation of what it should be. Figure 2 includes a default augmented model constructed by a simple sign analysis, and this is enough to prove the program faulty. Describing the proof in terms of the game, Player F (the Falsifier) is in charge of the choice of which natural number n is generated. If player F plays so as to force a positive n to be generated, this wins the game; player P still has some choice of moves, because the sign analysis could not determine whether y becomes zero or positive, but whichever of these is taken, execution ends up at the ERROR node.
The preceding example only works because we distinguish F and P nodes, and use a different rule for them; if P controlled the choice of n, he could force n = 0 and then ERROR is not reached. The example also illustrates the style in which we intend to deal with nondeterminism, which is needed to ensure that the program is tested over all inputs. Instead of using atomic nondeterministic statements such as havoc (e.g. [12] ), we propose to encode them using small control flow graphs consisting of choice edges and deterministic statements, and then analyse these with over-approximation in the same way as the rest of the program. The game structure will take care of making sure that all the possible choices are explored.
When we perform such verifications in HECTOR [5] , to which we have added an implementation of this approach, we put each piece of generating code into a non-recursive procedure, which we call a generator procedure, which helps structure the instrumentation process. However here we lack the space to discuss how our approach extends to procedures.
We have also used generator procedures with linked data structures, for example to generate all possible linked lists, which we use with models we build from a shape analysis (see [5] ). We intend also to experiment with modelling nondeterministic memory allocation in this way.
Incorporation of must information
The PhD thesis [7] proposes the use of mixed transition systems (MTSs) as models which can both verify and falsify properties of programs. This is achieved by using two transition relations: a "may" transition relation, which over-approximates and is like our abs − − →, and a "must" transition relation must − −− → which under-approximates. In this section we show that our augmented models can neatly capture all the must information that is present in a MTS, while: keeping the same node structure, remaining sound for both verification and falsification, and still only needing one transition relation. This is achieved essentially by changing the player in charge of particular nodes, and works because of the way we have carefully isolated nondeterminism into the choice statement, which is used to build generator procedures. We begin by defining MTSs. As in [7] , our definition relaxes the requirement in [11] that all must transitions are also may transitions, but it also adds M1 and M2 as natural constraints for our program abstractions. The follow theorem shows how MTSs can be used to falsify safety properties. − −− →) be a sound MTS for a program P . Consider a safety property expressed by a set B of bad configurations. To falsify B it is sufficient to find a sequence n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N with a 1 ) with s init ∈ γ(a 1 ), and
Next, as promised, we show how to simply construct an augmented model which neatly captures all the must information from an MTS, while keeping the same node structure as the underlying over-approximating model, remaining sound for both verification and falsification, and still only needing one transition relation.
The construction is simple, differing from the default augmented model in that, at any abstract node which has a must transition leaving it, we put player F in charge, and replace the outgoing 
F if E(l) has the form choice :
The following theorem shows that, after incorporating must information, the augmented model is still sound for both verification and falsification. Proof: Sketch only due to space constraints. Consider the sequence n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N demanded by the premises of Corollary 5.3. Proceed by induction on k. In the inductive step, apply the induction hypothesis to the suffix n 2 , . . . , n k to obtain Hn 2 and from this derive Hn 1 .
We end this section with an unresolved question. When incorporating must information, we have shown that we obtain all the falsification power of the MTS from which the must edges come; we also know that the augmented model remains sound for both verification and falsification. But it remains to be seen what happens to the verification and falsification power of the default augmented model when additional must edges are incorporated; we can contrive situations where this increases (as we would hope), decreases or remains unchanged, but do not have a feeling for what will happen in practice.
Conclusions and related work
In this paper, we used a two-player game to show that models which only overapproximate can nevertheless be used to falsify safety properties, that is, without using any under-approximation, feasibility checking or concrete counterexample search. To make this work, we focused on two properties of programs that are not accounted for in a conventional treatment of must transitions (e.g. [8] ) namely seriality and partial determinism. Through Example 4.1 we demonstrated how and why our method works. Finally, we showed that if some must transitions are available, they can be incorporated into our approach very easily. We proved that by doing this, we obtain in a simple way all the falsification power of the must transition approach, and yet our models remain sound for both verification and falsification, retain the same node structure and still require only a single transition relation.
Related work
The present paper explores what generalised model checking [2] , which effectively "case splits" on unknown propositions, means in the particular context of checking safety properties of programs. The existing works closest to ours, as far as we are aware, are [9] and [15] , which also build models which can both verify and falsify properties.
In [9] , which is specific to predicate abstraction domains, seriality is exploited but only for conditional statements (as in Figure 1 (right) ), and not for ordinary statements (needed for Figure 1 (left) ). For ordinary statements, [9] uses must transitions to weaker tri-vector states. The "must hyper-transitions" used in [15] also capture seriality, though this is not the motivation given in [15] for introducing them; rather, they are proposed as a way to make abstraction refinement monotonic. Both [9] and [15] require the use of two separate transition relations, whereas we need only one. Here we handle only safety properties expressed by giving a set of bad configurations, whereas [9, 15] handle the much more expressive temporal logic CTL, and additionally address automatic abstraction refinement which we do not. We emphasise the expected role of generator procedures, rather than atomic statements such as havoc, in producing more falsifications. Our method subsumes the "choose-free-paths" technique from [14] . ((l, a) 
The first situation is when E(l) has the form choice : l 1 : l 2 . By H1, either l 1 = l or l 2 = l . If l 1 = l then the choice-1 rule gives us (l, s) − → (l , s); on the other hand if l 2 = l then the choice-2 rule provides the same conclusion. By H2, we have a = a, whence s ∈ γ(a ). Putting s := s we have found, as required,
The second situation is when E(l) doesn't have the form choice : l 1 : l 2 , and there exists n = (l , a ) ∈ N such that n For the inductive case, k > 1, let n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N (where each n i is (l i , a i )) be such that n 1 must − −− → n 2 must − −− → · · · must − −− → n k and {l k } × γ(a k ) ⊆ B and γ(a 1 ) is nonempty.
γ(a 1 ) is nonempty so there exists s 1 ∈ γ(a 1 ). By S2, there exists some s 2 in γ(a 2 ) such that (l 1 , s 1 ) − → (l 2 , s 2 ). Therefore γ(a 2 ) is also nonempty, and we can apply the induction hypothesis to the suffix n 2 , . . . , n k ∈ N , obtaining Hn 2 . Because there is a must transition leaving n 1 (i.e. the one to n 2 ) it follows from the definition of M + [ must − −− →] that ρ(n) = F . We can use the h-F-move rule to complete the proof if we can show n 1 abs − − → + n 2 . There are two cases to check. In the first case, E(l 1 ) has form choice : l : l . It follows from M2 that a 1 = a 2 . From (l 1 , s 1 ) − → (l 2 , s 2 ), using S1, there exists (l 2 , a ) ∈ N such that (l 1 , a 1 ) abs − − → (l 2 , a ). By H2, a = a 1 , and we already know a 1 = a 2 . Thus we have 
